The Distribution of Contraceptives to Unemancipated Minors: Does a Parent Have a Constitutional Right to Be Notified? by Rue, Jonathan L.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 69 | Issue 2 Article 8
1980
The Distribution of Contraceptives to
Unemancipated Minors: Does a Parent Have a
Constitutional Right to Be Notified?
Jonathan L. Rue
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rue, Jonathan L. (1980) "The Distribution of Contraceptives to Unemancipated Minors: Does a Parent Have a Constitutional Right
to Be Notified?," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 69 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol69/iss2/8
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACEPTIVES TO
UNEMANCIPATED MINORS: DOES A PARENT
HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
NOTIFIED?
INTRODUCTION
Designed to cope with the increasing problem of out-of-
wedlock pregnancies among minors,1 state funded distribution
of contraceptives to minors recently has been challenged in
courts by parents asserting violations of their own constitu-
tional rights.2 Efforts to distribute contraceptives to minors
emerged as a response to statistics indicating that, in the face
of a declining overall birth rate in the 1970's, out-of-wedlock
births continued to increase, especially among teenage
mothers.3 Due to these developments, various groups have
taken the position that minors should have free access to con-
traceptives.4 Others, however, strongly believe that to allow a
minor access to contraceptives, particularly in the absence of
parental notification, can only result in increased teenage pro-
miscuity, contrary to a policy of discouraging sexual inter-
course by unwed minors.5
The issue of whether a state may distribute contracep-
tives to unemancipated minors without first notifying their
See Morris, Estimating the Need for Family Planning Services Among Unwed
Teenagers, 6 FAm. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 91, 92 (1974).
2 See Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101
S. Ct. 95 (1980).
3 Paul, Legal Rights of Minors to Sex-Related Medical Care, 6 COLUM. HuMN
RIGHTS L. REV. 357, 358 (1975).
4 These groups include social workers, physicians, attorneys, state legislators and
others. For example, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has
taken the official position that an "unmarried female of any age whose sexual behav-
ior exposes her to possible conception should have access to the most effective meth-
ods of contraception." Pilpel & Wechsler, Birth Control, Teenagers and the Law: A
New Look, 3 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 37, 43 (1971).
5 For arguments against providing minors with access to contraceptives, see Ca-
rey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977).
6 The term "minor" is defined as "[a]n infant or person who is under the age of
legal competence." BLACK'S LAW DICToNARY 899 (5th ed. 1979). An unemancipated
minor is a minor who is still under the care of his parents. This usually means a
minor who is still residing with his parents.
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parents is made increasingly complex by the conflict among
the interests of the state, the interests and rights of minors,
and the interests and rights of the minors' parents.7 Although
the United States Supreme Court has not yet rendered a deci-
sion on the merits of this issue,8 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit faced this complex question in Doe v. Irwin.9 In
Irwin, the parents of a sixteen-year-old girl who received con-
traceptives from a publicly operated family-planning center,
along with parents of other teenage children who lived in the
area served by the clinic, brought a class action against the
administrators of the family-planning center and board mem-
bers of the county health department. 10 The parents, who
were not notified by the center of the distribution of contra-
ceptives to their children, alleged that the defendants' policy
deprived them of rights guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution.1 The Sixth Circuit held that actions taken by the
center did not infringe upon a constitutional right of the
plaintiffs and that the center had no constitutional obligation
to notify the plaintiffs before distributing contraceptives to
their minor children.' 2 The court limited its holding in that it
failed to address the issue of whether the rights and interests
of minors and the state should prevail over the rights and in-
terests of parents of minors receiving contraceptives in cases
where the rights of the parents are actually infringed to some
degree.'"
See generally Casenote, 56 J. URB. L. 268 (1978-79).
* The Court recently placed under review a case involving a Utah statute that
requires a physician who is requested by a minor female to perform an abortion on
her to notify the minor's parents prior to performing the abortion. H_. L. v.
Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah), prob. juris. noted, 445 U.S. 903, (1980). A decision in
that case would have an important bearing upon the issue discussed in this comment.
" 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 95 (1980).
0 Specifically, the defendants were administrators of the Tri-County Planning
Center and board members and administrators of the Ingham County, Michigan,
Health Department. Id. at 1163.
" Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977), vacated and remanded,
559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977), reaff'd, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd, 615
F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 95 (1980). The plain-
tiffs originally asserted constitutional rights and privileges guaranteed them by the
first, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments.
,2 615 F.2d at 1169.
" See text accompanying notes 70-82 infra for a more complete explanation of
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This comment will consider the development of the right
to use contraceptives, particularly as applied to use by minors,
and will then discuss this right in relation to the rights and
interests of both parents and the state. It will further propose
that, in balancing these rights and interests, the Sixth Circuit
and other courts faced with this issue should deny parents the
relief they seek, due to compelling state interests and the in-
creasing recognition of the privacy rights of minors.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN MATTERS
RELATING TO SEX, CHILDBEARING, CONTRACEPTION AND FAMILY
AFFAIRS
A. Constitutional Sources for the Right of Privacy
Although the United States Constitution does not specifi-
cally state that a person has the right to make personal deci-
sions in matters relating to sex, childbirth, and family affairs,
free from unwarranted state interference, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to include
this right.14 The Court has focused on various sources for this
fundamental right, including the fourteenth amendment,15 the
ninth amendment,16 and a "penumbra" which surrounds the
Bill of Rights.17 By interpreting the Constitution in this flex-
ible manner, the Court has laid a foundation upon which per-
the context in which this issue would arise.
14 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptives); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing and education). The right of privacy was first articu-
lated in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890-91).
15 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court specifically stated that the
word liberty denotes:
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the indivi-
dual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and gener-
ally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399.
'" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
1'7 The Griswold Court stated that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance." Id. at 484.
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sonal rights can be based. Thus, the Court has used several
amendments to the Constitution and the cases interpreting
these amendments to limit state interference into matters of
personal privacy, including sexual relations, childbearing,
abortion and the use of contraceptives.
B. Griswold v. Connecticut: The Right of Privacy Inter-
preted to Include the Right to Use Contraceptives
Changing social values and problems such as poverty,
hunger, overcrowding, pollution and inflation led to increased
use of contraceptives in the United States throughout the
1950's, 1960's and 1970's.18 This trend, however, conflicted
with several state statutes then in effect forbidding the use of
contraceptives by any person.19 Griswold v. Connecticut20 in-
volved a challenge to a Connecticut statute forbidding the use
of contraceptives.21 The Court held that the case involved a
relationship (marriage) within the "zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees," and that the
invasion of this relationship was unconstitutional.2
Although Griswold expanded the right of privacy to in-
clude the use of contraceptives by married persons, it re-
18 See generally J. REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE 376 (1978). This
trend is not limited to the United States. Within the past 20 years, scholars and
social workers have noted "a radical change in governmental and other institutional
attitudes toward the practice of contraception, a shift from historical positions of
overt or covert hostility to the present general advocacy, support and sponsorship of
family planning programs." Nortman, Demographic-Social and Family Planning As-
pects of Contraceptive Sterilization in Countries Other Than the United States,
Puerto Rico and India, BEHAvioRAL-SocmL ASPECTS OF CoNTRAcEPTIE STERILIZATION
63 (S. Newman & Z. Klein eds. 1978).
" E.g., COiqN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (West 1958) (repealed 1969). The statute
provided that "[a]ny person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for
the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or im-
prisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and impris-
oned." Id.
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21 See note 19 supra for the text of the statute.
22 381 U.S. at 485. Referring to the statute's prohibiting the use of contracep-
tives, rather than merely regulating their sale or manufacture, the Court stated that
"[sluch a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this
Court," that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Id.
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mained unclear whether this right extended to unmarried in-
dividuals. 23 The Supreme Court answered affirmatively in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,24 which held that individuals, married or
single, have a right of privacy in deciding whether they should
or should not use contraceptives. 25
Although the decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ex-
pounded on the right of privacy as applied to the use of con-
traceptives, the decisions left unanswered the questions
whether the right would be extended to unmarried minors"
and the extent to which a state could regulate the use of con-
traceptives without violating the United States Constitution.
II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACEPTIVES TO
UNEMANCIPATED MINORS
A. Judicial Extension of the Right of Privacy to Minors:
Carey v. Population Services International
The combination of the trend toward acceptance of con-
traceptives in modern society,28 the overwhelming problems
associated with teenage pregnancy 29 and the expansion of pri-
22 The Griswold Court's emphasis on the sanctity and "sacred" nature of the
marital relationship contributed strongly to this uncertainty. Id. at 486.
2 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
23 The Court specifically stated that "[ijf the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453. Accord, Baird v. Lynch, 390 F. Supp.
740 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (Wisconsin statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives to un-
married persons held unconstitutional).
26 The question of minors' rights to use contraceptives is made especially critical
by minors' particularly acute need to avoid conception. See generally Pipel &
Wechsler, supra note 4, at 37.
" For a discussion of the historical development of adults' rights of privacy and
an evaluation of minors' rights of access to contraceptives, see Note, Juvenile Pri-
vacy: A Minor's Right of Access to Contraceptives, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 371, 372
(1978).
's See generally REED, supra note 18.
29 Over one million teenagers become pregnant each year in the United States.
HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON POPULATION, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON FERTILITY
AND CONTRACEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (Comm. Print 1978). These resulting
problems are both medical and social in nature. "The medical disadvantages of teen-
age pregnancies include high risks of toxemia and low infant birth weight, resulting in
higher rates of infant mortality, mental retardation and birth defects among children
of adolescent mothers than among children of adult mothers." Id. The social
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vacy rights by the United States Supreme Court 0 resulted in
a movement to provide minors with birth control methods. 1
This movement, however, conflicted with several state stat-
utes forbidding distribution of contraceptives to minors.
3 2
A New York statute33 forbidding the sale or distribution
of contraceptives to minors was challenged in Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International." In holding that the law un-
constitutionally infringed upon the rights of minors,3 5 the Su-
problems include psychological effects on the unwed mother, including the "stigma of
unwed motherhood" and the overall "distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Furthermore, pregnancy is
the single largest cause of school dropouts among minors in lower socioeconomic clas-
ses. Comment, The Law and the Legal Impact of Contraceptive Use by Minors in
North Carolina, 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 304, 312 n.38 (1974-75). See also E. BOULDING,
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE WHEEL OF LIFE 27 (1979).
30 E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
" A 1972 Gallup poll found that 75% of Americans believed that birth control
information services and counseling should be made available to sexually active un-
married teenagers. Paul, Pilpel & Wechsler, Pregnancy, Teenagers and the Law, 6
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 142, 144 (1974).
This movement, however, has been extremely controversial. Its opponents have
argued that by introducing minors to contraceptives the state is helping to establish
sexual intercourse among unmarried teenagers as culturally acceptable or even desira-
ble. T. LIrLEWOOD, THE POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL 135-37 (1977). In spite of
this opposition, physicians and family planning clinics nationwide have begun to edu-
cate sexually active minors as to the various methods of birth control. See generally
REPORT ON FERTILITY AND CONRHACEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 29, at 79.
32 E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811 (8) (McKinney 1972). The statute made it a Class
A misdemeanor for "[a]ny person to sell or distribute" any contraceptive of any kind
to a minor under 16 years of age.
33 Id.
34 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See note 32 supra for a description of the statute.
The plaintiffs in the district court were Population Planning Associates, Inc.,
Population Services International, Rev. James Hagen, three physicians and an adult
New York resident. The court granted standing to Population Planning Associates,
Inc. in its own right and on behalf of its potential clients (minors). Id. at 683, citing
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The defendants were various New York State
officials. For a discussion of the implications of the Carey case, see Comment, Carey,
Kids and Contraceptives: Privacy's Problem Child, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 750 (1978).
11 431 U.S. at 684. The Court focused on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as the source for this right, stating that "[a]lthough '[t]he Constitution
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy,' the Court has recognized that one
aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is 'a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of pri-
vacy.' "Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
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preme Court stated that decisions relating to marriage,36
procreation, 7 contraception, 8 family relationships 9 and the
rearing and education of children40 are "among the decisions
that an individual may make without unjustified government
interference. ' 41 The Court further concluded that "[t]he deci-
sion whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very
heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices."42
As to whether this constitutionally protected choice ex-
tends to minors, the Carey Court concluded that, in light of
its decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,45 the right of privacy in connection with decisions
affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults."
The Court further noted that the state had failed to meet the
burden of showing a "significant state interest ... that is not
present in the case of an adult, '45 and that therefore the in-
terference was unconstitutional.46
36 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
37 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
38 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
39 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
40 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
41 431 U.S. at 685.
42 Id.
43 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
44 431 U.S. at 693.
41 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)). The
Court based this conclusion in part on the state's failure to demonstrate that the
prohibition against distribution of contraceptives to minors measurably contributed
to the deterrent purpose that the state advanced as a justification for the restriction.
Id. at 695. It further stated that it would be unreasonable to assume that the state
had prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child (or the physical and
psychological dangers of an abortion) as punishment for fornication. Id. (citing Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).
46 Id. at 696. The decision left unanswered the question to what extent a state
could legitimately regulate the distribution of contraceptives to minors. Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion, however, specifically states that "a requirement of prior pa-
rental consultation is merely one illustration of permissible regulation in this area."
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). The majority, however, did not so indicate.
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B. Parental Consent as a Means of Regulating the Distribu-
tion of Contraceptives to Minors
State statutes imposing a parental consent requirement
prior to the distribution of contraceptives to minors47 re-
mained in question following the Carey decision. Although the
Supreme Court has not ruled on a parental consent require-
ment in connection with the distribution of contraceptives, a
three-judge district court has held that Utah state regulations
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors ab-
sent parental consent violate a minor's right of privacy and
are unconstitutional. " The court also found the Utah regula-
tions to be in conflict with the provisions and regulations ac-
companying the Social Security Act." In analyzing the consti-
tutional issues, 50 the court saw "no developmental differences
between minors and adults that may affect the gravity of the
right asserted by sexually active minors to family planning
services and materials." 51
" See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 40-2-50(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1967).
11 T H.._ L v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873, 877 (D. Utah 1975). Contra, Doe v.
Planned Parenthood Ass'n, 510 P.2d 75 (Utah 1973), appeal dismissed, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 805 (1973). In Doe v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n, the Utah Supreme Court
denied a sixteen-year-old girl the right to obtain contraceptives without parental con-
sent. The court stated that "[t]he name of the defendant indicates that its service
should be available to those couples who desire to control the size of their family. It is
not intended to make strumpets or streetwalkers out of minor girls." Id. at 75. The
opinion also emphasized parents' rights to rear their children as they choose. Id. at
76. For a discussion of Doe v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n, see Comment, Doe v.
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah-The Constitutional Right of Minors to Obtain
Contraceptives Without Parental Consent, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 433.
1" Id. at 877-78. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15)(A) (1974) provides for state plans for the
administration of aid to families with dependent children. It requires states to de-
velop programs for the prevention of out-of-wedlock births by assuring that in all
appropriate cases (including cases involving minors who can be considered to be sexu-
ally active) family planning services are offered to all individuals voluntarily request-
ing such services.
This conflict between the Utah regulations and the Social Security Act was a
persuasive factor in the Court's decision in T_ H_ v. Jones. The district court in
Irwin, however, apparently did not find such a conflict to be conclusive in a case
involving notice. 428 F. Supp. 1198, 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
11 For an analysis of the constitutional issues involved in parental consent re-
quirements, see Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors:
The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 Hnv. L. REv. 1001 (1975).
51 425 F. Supp. at 881.
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Decisions of lower federal courts52 and of the United
States Supreme Court53 declaring unconstitutional parental
consent requirements prior to the performance of an abortion
on a minor5 4 provide a basis for determining the constitution-
ality of a requirement of parental consent before minors may
receive contraceptives. These decisions support the conclusion
of the district court in Utah.55 In Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Missouri v. Danforth,56 the Supreme Court held that the
state may not constitutionally impose a blanket parental con-
sent requirement as a condition for an abortion performed on
an unmarried minor during the first twelve weeks of her preg-
nancy.57 In scrutinizing the interference with the minor's right
of privacy, the Court stated that a determination must be
made as to whether there is any significant state interest in
conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent that is not
present in the case of an adult.58 The Court concluded that
the interest of safeguarding parental authority is insufficient
to meet this test.59
Following Danforth, the Supreme Court clarified its posi-
tion on the constitutionality of parental consent requirements
for abortions.60 In Bellotti v. Baird,61 the Court struck down a
Massachusetts statute 2 that required parental consent prior
52 See, e.g., Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1974); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F.
Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), afrd in part, rev'd in part, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
53 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976).
E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 214.185 (1974) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
See generally Casenote, supra note 7.
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
Id. at 75. The Court cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973), as precedent
for the decision to leave the abortion decision and its effectuation to the medical
judgment of the woman's attending physician.
58 428 U.S. at 75. Some commentators have approved of this test as an effective
mechanism for taking into consideration the special legal status of minors while si-
multaneously affording an opportunity for minors to secure fundamental rights. See,
e.g., Comment, Closing the Curtain on Comstockery, 44 BROoKLYN L. REv. 565, 585
(1978).
59 428 U.S. at 75.
10 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
61 Id.
62 MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 112, § 12S (Law. Co-op Supp. 1980). The statute pro-
vided that
[i]f the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married,
[Vol. 69
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to the performance of an abortion on a minor female. 3 The
statute was less restrictive than the statute involved in Dan-
forth64 because it provided for judicial consent in the event
that parental consent could not be obtained.65 Nevertheless,
the Court determined that since the statute required parental
consultation or notification in every instance," without afford-
ing the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an indepen-
dent judicial determination that she was mature enough to
consent or that the abortion was in her best interests, it was
in fact an absolute limitation and therefore unconstitutional
under Danforth.7
Although Danforth and Bellotti did not involve contra-
ceptives, those decisions indicate that the Supreme Court
would declare a parental consent requirement prior to the dis-
tribution of contraceptives unconstitutional as well. 8 State
statutes also have begun to reflect the expanding recognition
of privacy rights of minors as applied to the acquisition of
family-planning services.6 9 As a result of this recent merger of
the consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both
of the mother's parents refuses such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court, for good cause shown, after such
hearing as he deems necessary.
Id.
Id Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 627 (1979).
64 H.C.S. House Bill No. 1211, an Act relating to abortion with penalty provi-
sions and emergency clause, reprinted in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 84 app. (1976).
4" MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 112, § 12S (Law Co-op Supp. 1980).
"0 See also, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D.
Mo. 1980); Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542 (D.
Me. 1979). But see H_ L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah), prob. juris. noted,
445 U.S. 903 (1980).
67 443 U.S. at 643-45. The Court referred to what is commonly described as the
"mature minor" exception. See generally Paul, supra note 3, at 362.
" See Comment, supra note 58, at 584. Furthermore, the decisions in Carey v.
Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), and T_ H_. v. Jones, 425 F. Supp.
873 (D. Utah 1975), provide some authority for this conclusion. But cf. Petitioners
Brief for Certiorari at 14, Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980) (petitioners
argued that the abortion question is unique and therefore distinguishable from con-
traceptive decisions).
69 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 90.65.100(a) (Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-
2904(f) (Supp. 1978); KRS § 214.185 (1974). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, FAMILY PLANNING, CONTRACEPTION, VOLUNTARY STERILIZA-
TION AND ABORTION: AN ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, EACH
1980-81]
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the interests of the state and of minors who seek contracep-
tives without parental notification, some parents have alleged
state interference in family matters and have instituted court
challenges to statutes or regulations providing minors free ac-
cess to contraceptives.
III. NOTICE TO PARENTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF
CONTRACEPTIVES TO THEIR MINOR CHILDREN: A BALANCING OF
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
A. Doe v. Irwin: The Sixth Circuit's View on Notice
Requirements
Doe v. Irwin" presented the next issue surrounding the
distribution of contraceptives to minors: whether parents have
a constitutional right to receive notice from state funded fam-
ily planning clinics prior to the distribution of contraceptives
to their minor children. 1 In Irwin, the suing parents alleged
that the distribution of contraceptives to their unemancipated
minor children without the parents' consent or knowledge vio-
lated their constitutional right to rear and educate their chil-
dren as they chose.7 2 The Sixth Circuit held that there is no
constitutional requirement of notice to parents prior to the
distribution of contraceptives to their children and that no
unconstitutional interference with the plaintiffs' rights as par-
ents occurred.73 In so holding, the court distinguished cases
STATE AND JURISDICTION (1978).
70 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 95 (1980).
1 See Casenote, supra note 7, at 273.
7 Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198, 1200 (W.D. Mich. 1977), vacated and re-
manded, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977), reaff'd, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977),
rev'd, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 95 (1980).
Minors were permitted to come to the center with or without parental consent, and
contraceptives were prescribed and distributed to minors with or without parental
consent or knowledge. The center served no minor until he or she had attended a
"rap session" at which birth control methods, the responsibilities of being sexually
active and the desirability of communicating with parents concerning sex and birth
control were discussed. Those who desired contraceptives after the "rap session" were
given a physical examination. If no medical problems were indicated, the patient was
given a supply of birth control pills. The decision whether a particular individual
would receive contraceptives was made in every case by a physician. 615 F.2d at 1163.
7 Id. at 1169.
[Vol. 69
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such as Meyer v. Nebraska,7 ' Pierce v. Society of Sisters7 5
and Wisconsin v. Yoder,8 which established parents' rights to
rear and educate their children, by noting that in each of
those cases the state either required or prohibited some activ-
ity, whereas in Irwin the state imposed no compulsory re-
quirements or prohibitions that affected rights of the plain-
tiffs.77 The court supported this conclusion by pointing out
that the state had merely established a voluntary birth con-
trol clinic and that there was no prohibition against the plain-
tiffs' participating in decisions of their minor children on is-
sues of sexual activity and birth control.7 s From these
findings, the court concluded there was no need to consider
whether a compelling state interest was involved or whether
parental rights outweighed the rights of their minor
children.
7 9
The court's decision in Irwin left unanswered a crucial
question: whether the privacy rights of minors and any com-
pelling state interests outweigh parental rights and interests
in cases involving distribution of contraceptives to minors
without parental notice. The court did identify a minor's right
of personal privacy,80 a parent's right to the care, custody and
nurture of his or her children,81 and a legitimate state interest
in protecting minor females from the physical and emotional
hazards of unwanted pregnancies, 82 but it failed to balance
these various rights and interests and to provide a complete
resolution of the issues. Although parental notification is a
complex and delicate issue, it is one which must be resolved in
order to establish a rule of law that more clearly defines the
extent of the rights and interests of parents, minors and the
state.
7 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
75 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
76 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
77 615 F.2d at 1168.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1169.
8o Id. at 1167.
6' Id.
82 Id.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
B. The State's Interest in a Minor's Unrestricted Access to
Contraceptives
There are several legitimate state interests involved in
the state's unrestricted distribution of contraceptives to mi-
nors. First, the state has a legitimate interest in solving the
problem of out-of-wedlock teenage pregnancy, along with the
emotional, physical and financial burdens that it causes the
would-be mothers.83 The distribution of contraceptives is a le-
gitimate means to that end. Second, the state has an interest
in alleviating the financial burden placed upon taxpayers in
the event that a minor's pregnancy results in an unwanted
and unaffordable child.8 ' Finally, the state has an interest in
protecting the privacy rights of minors8 5 as recognized by re-
cent United States Supreme Court decisions. 8
C. The Interests and Rights of Minors
The Supreme Court has recognized that under the Con-
stitution, minors are persons "possessed with fundamental
rights which the state must respect. 8 7 Decisions such as
Tinker v. Des Moines School District8 and In re Gault"9 ex-
tended specific fundamental rights to minors without differen-
tiating between minors and adults; however, only with the
Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth" were these privacy rights interpreted to include
matters of sexual preference."1 Not only do minors have an
63 For a discussion of the consequences of unwanted teenage pregnancies, see
Paul, supra note 3, at 358-59.
" See generally REPORT ON FERTILITY AND CONTRACEPTION IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 27, at 79.
" See Casenote, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1135, 1144 (1979).
81 E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
87 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). See also Note,
supra note 50, at 1008.
88 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment right to protest Vietnam War applicable
to minors).
89 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (procedural due process guaranteed to minors as well as to
adults). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
90 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
"' The Court stated that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
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interest in protecting these fundamental rights, but they also
have the practical interest of being able to not bear or beget a
child and yet remain sexually active.
Although various constitutional rights, including privacy
rights, have been held applicable to minors, these rights have
not been interpreted as absolute. The Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly stated that "the power of the state to control the con-
duct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults." 2 Application of this rule is difficult in cases like Ir-
win, however, since the state's interests in Irwin coincided
with and supported the rights and interests of minors; there
was no state attempt to limit minors' rights and interests.93
D. Parental Rights and Interests
In holding that parents do have a constitutional right to
notice prior to the distribution of contraceptives to their chil-
dren, the district court in Irwin described parental authority
as "plenary."' 94 The court stated that "parental authority...
prevails over the claims of the state, other outsiders and the
children themselves. There must be some compelling justifica-
tion for interference." 5
Parental rights have indeed been traditionally recognized
by the Supreme Court. Parents' rights to the custody, care
and religious and moral education of their children are well-
established. 8 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,97 a 1972 Supreme Court
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
Id. at 74. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), expanded the right
of privacy to include the right to use contraceptives.
92 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968), (quoting Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1976).
93 Cf. Casenote, supra note 7, at 273.
94 Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (W.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd, 615 F.2d 1162
(6th Cir. 1980), - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 95 (1980). In taking this position the district
court relied heavily on Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their Rights, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.
605.
441 F. Supp. at 1249.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (rights of
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decision involving parents asserting state interference with
their constitutional rights to rear their children, the Court
stated that parents have a fundamental interest that prevails
over that of the state in guiding the religious future and edu-
cation of their children.
9
8
E. Balancing the Interests
In order to provide all interested parties with an ade-
quate answer to the question of whether notice to parents is
constitutionally required prior to distribution of contracep-
tives to unwed minors, the various rights and interests de-
scribed above must be balanced. When one considers all rele-
vant factors and focuses upon constitutional considerations
and social policy, the conclusion emerges that the compelling
interests of the state and the increasingly recognized rights of
minors outweigh parents' rights and interests in prior notice.
Irwin presents a unique situation in that the state is
aligned with minors against parents. This alignment has an
effect on the application of past Supreme Court decisions to
this case and to similar situations. The parental rights cases99
are distinguishable in that the state in those cases had re-
quired the interference with parental rights. In Irwin, minors
voluntarily received contraceptives distributed by a state-
funded clinic. 100 Even without such a distinction, application
of the parental rights cases would not necessarily tip the
scales in favor of parental rights and interests against those of
the state and minors. The Supreme Court made it clear in
Prince v. Massachusetts that parental rights are not
unlimited.101
Parents' rights should be limited in cases such as Irwin
for several reasons. First, the state has a compelling interest
parenthood are not beyond limitation).
9" 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The case involved a challenge by Amish parents to a Wis-
consin statute which, contrary to the parents' beliefs, required school attendance up
to a certain age. The Court declared the law unconstitutional. Id. at 234.
98 Id. at 232.
99 See note 96 supra for citations to decisions concerning parental rights.
100 Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S.
101 S. Ct. 95 (1980).
101 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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in solving the problems associated with teenage pregnancies,
and the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a valid
means of achieving that end. Although at least one member of
the Court has taken the position that parental notification re-
quirements might be a legitimate regulation of the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to minors,10 2 the practical effect of such
a requirement would likely be that minors would simply stop
using the services offered by family-planning centers.10 3 Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized minors'
rights of privacy in Danforth, Carey and Betlotti. These cases
imply that parental notification would impermissably infringe
upon the rights of minors. The best interests 04 of sexually ac-
tive minors would be served by allowing them access to con-
traceptives without notification of their parents.
10 5
CONCLUSION
Although the Sixth Circuit's decision in Doe v. Irwin
reached a correct result, the court failed to provide an answer
to the critical question whether compelling state interests and
extended privacy rights of minors outweigh parents' rights to
rear and educate their children. The issue surrounding the re-
quirement of parental notice prior to the distribution of con-
traceptives should be finally resolved by the Supreme Court.
The task will be difficult in light of the sincere and valid in-
terests of the interested parties. Nevertheless, the Court
102 Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 710 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
103 For a similar conclusion, see Comment, Parental Notification as a Prerequi-
site for Minors' Access to Contraceptives: A Behavioral and Legal Analysis, 13 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 196, 205 (1979).
Since it appears that at least some children would cease using contraceptives
rather than have their parents notified, it is difficult to propose a compromise re-
quirement similar to the requirement of a judicial hearing in order to determine
whether the minor is mature enough to obtain an abortion. The centers must attempt
to induce sexually active minors to make use of their services by providing a free
access system. Anything less will inhibit the effectiveness of their programs.
10 This standard is often used in child custody cases. See, e.g., In re Camm, 294
So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866 (1974).
103 For an excellent analysis of state intrusion into family affairs, see Note, State
Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383
(1974-75).
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should extend the privacy decisions one step further to in-
clude a minor's right to free access to safe methods of birth
control.
Jonathan L. Rue
